Financial regulation is often framed as a question of economic e¢ciency. This paper, by contrast, puts the distributive implications of …nancial regulation center stage. We develop a model in which the …nancial sector bene…ts from risk-taking by earning greater expected returns. However, risk-taking also increases the incidence of large losses that lead to credit crunches and impose negative externalities on the real economy. Given incomplete risk markets between the …nancial sector and the real economy, we describe a Pareto frontier along which di¤erent levels of risk-taking map into di¤erent levels of welfare for the two parties. A regulator has to trade o¤ e¢ ciency in the …nancial sector, which is aided by deregulation, against e¢ ciency in the real economy, which is aided by tighter regulation and a more stable supply of credit. We also show that …nancial innovation, asymmetric compensation schemes, concentration in the banking system, and bailout expectations enable or encourage greater risk-taking and allocate greater surplus to the …nancial sector at the expense of the rest of the economy.
Introduction
Financial regulation is often framed as a question of economic e¢ ciency in the economic literature. However, the intense political debate on the topic suggests that redistributive questions are front and center in setting …nancial regulation. In the aftermath of the …nancial crisis of 2008/09, for example, consumer organizations, labor unions and political parties championing worker interests have strongly advocated a tightening of …nancial regulation, whereas …nancial institutions and their representatives have issued dire warnings of the dangers and high costs of tighter regulation.
Financial regulation matters for the rest of the economy because the …nancial sector plays a central role in a modern market economy (see e.g. Caballero, 2010) . It provides credit to all sectors of the economy and intermediates capital to its most productive use. As long as the …nancial sector is well capitalized, it can ful…ll this role almost seamlessly. During such times, it seems as if the …nancial system was just a veil and the economy can be well understood without explicitly considering the …nancial sector.
If the …nancial sector su¤ers large losses and …nds itself short of capital, however, it imposes large negative externalities on the rest of the economy. It can no longer ful…ll its role of intermediating savings to productive investment and spending opportunities, leading to a credit crunch and a decline in output that hurts all other factor owners in the economy: for example, workers experience unemployment and declines in their wages even though their labor could be employed more productively if the …nancial intermediation process were working well. These observations are consistent with the experience of the US during the 2008/09 …nancial crisis, as illustrated in Figure 1 . The …rst panel depicts the decline in bank equity during the crisis. 1 The second panel shows the concurrent increase in the spread between interest rates for risky borrowing and safe rates. Although some of this increase is attributable to higher default risk, a signi…cant fraction is due to constraints in the …nancial system (see e.g. Adrian et al., 2010) .
The last panel shows the steep decline in the wage bill over the course of the crisis. The recovery in this variable was somewhat sluggish, possibly because the initial shock to the …nancial sector was aggravated by aggregate demand problems and constraints on household balance sheets. Similar macroeconomic e¤ects have been observed during …nancial crises for centuries (see e.g. Reinhart and Rogo¤, 2009 ).
The crisis occurred after decades of …nancial deregulation had removed the restrictions on …nancial sector risk-taking that had been imposed after the Great Depression (see e.g. Abiad et al., 2010) . This process of deregulation was accompanied by strong growth in the size of the …nancial sector to levels not seen since the late 1920s (Philippon and Reshef, 2013a) . And as the …nancial crisis of 2008/09 demonstrated vividly, deregulation also led to a more volatile …nancial system in which the real economy was exposed to an increased risk of credit crunches. This paper develops a formal model to analyze the distributive con ‡ict inherent in regulating risk-taking in the …nancial sector. We capture the special role of the …nancial sector by assuming that it is the only sector that can engage in …nancial intermediation and channel capital into productive investments. This assumption applies to the …nancial sector in a broad sense, including brokerdealers, the shadow …nancial system and all other actors that engage in …nancial intermediation. For simplicity, we will refer to all actors in the …nancial sector broadly de…ned as "bankers. " We introduce two types of …nancial imperfections into our model. First, bankers su¤ers from a commitment problem and need to have su¢ cient capital in order to engage in …nancial intermediation. This captures the standard notion that bankers need to have "skin in the game" to ensure proper incentives. Secondly, insurance markets between bankers and the rest of society are incomplete. We capture this by making the extreme assumption that the holdings of bank equity are concentrated in the hands of bankers. More generally, a su¢ cient condition is that the holdings of bank equity are not proportionally distributed across the …nancial elite and the rest of society. 2 Because of the "skin in the game"-constraint, a well-capitalized …nancial sector is essential for the rest of the economy. In particular, the …nancial sector needs to hold a certain minimum level of capital to intermediate the …rst-best level of credit in the economy and achieve the optimal level of output. If aggregate bank capital declines below this threshold, binding …nancial constraints force bankers to cut back on credit to the rest of the economy. The resulting credit crunch causes output to contract, wages to decline and lending spreads to increase, capturing the typical e¤ects of …nancial crises that we illustrated in Figure 1 . At a technical level, these price movements constitute pecuniary externalities that hurt the real economy but bene…t bankers.
When …nancial institutions decide how much risk to take on, they trade o¤ the bene…ts of risk-taking in terms of higher expected return with the risk of being constrained, but they do not internalize the negative externalities on the rest of the economy. Bankers always choose a strictly positive level of risk-taking in our model so as to earn superior returns. By contrast, workers are averse to ‡uctuations in bank capital and would like to limit the level of risk-taking in the …nancial sector to ensure a more stable supply of credit to the real economy. We characterize a Pareto-frontier along which higher levels of risk-taking correspond to higher levels of welfare for bankers and lower levels of welfare for workers. We interpret …nancial regulation and deregulation as imposing or relaxing regulatory constraints on risk-taking, which moves the economy along this Pareto frontier. In a sense, …nancial regulators need to trade o¤ e¢ ciency in the …nancial sector, which is aided by deregulation, against e¢ ciency in the real economy, which is aided by tighter regulation and a more stable supply of credit.
The distributive con ‡ict over risk-taking and regulation is the result of both …nancial imperfections in our model. If bankers weren't …nancially constrained, then they could always intermediate the optimal amount of capital and their risk-taking would not a¤ect the real economy. Similarly, if risk markets were complete, then bankers and the rest of the economy would share not only the downside but also the bene…ts of …nancial risk-taking. In both cases, the distributive con ‡ict would disappear. By contrast, in our benchmark framework in which both …nancial frictions are present, the occasionally binding …nancial constraint on bankers imposes one-sided negative externalities on workers in the form of credit crunches.
Our …ndings are consistent with the experience of a large number of countries in recent decades: deregulation allowed for record pro…ts in the …nancial sector, which bene…tted largely the …nancial elite (see e.g. Philippon and Reshef, 2013a) . Simultaneously, most countries also experienced a decline in their labor share (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2013) . When crisis struck, e.g. during the …nancial crisis of 2008/09, economies experienced a sharp decline in …nancial intermediation and real capital investment, with substantial negative externalities on workers and the rest of the economy. Such occasionally binding …nancial constraints are also generally viewed as the main driving force behind …nancial crises in the quantitative macro literature (see e.g. Mendoza, 2010) .
Drawing an analogy to more traditional forms of externalities, we can compare …nancial deregulation to the relaxation of safety rules on nuclear power plants: such a relaxation will reduce costs, which increases the pro…ts of the nuclear industry in most states of nature and may bene…t the rest of society via reduced electricity rates. However, it comes at a heightened risk of nuclear meltdowns that impose massive negative externalities on the rest of society. In expectation, relaxing safety rules increases the pro…ts of the nuclear sector at the expense of the rest of society.
We analyze a number of extensions to study how risk-taking in the …nancial sector interacts with the distribution of resources in our model economy. We in-vestigate the e¤ects of …nancial innovation that enables bankers to take on more risk by providing them with access to a wider menu of investment options and …nd that it always bene…ts bankers, but it may result in higher volatility and impose greater externalities on workers. We provide an example in which workers are unambiguously worse o¤ from …nancial innovation. Similarly, if bank managers have asymmetric compensation packages, they will have incentives to take on higher risks and expose the rest of the economy to larger negative externalities.
If bankers have market power, we …nd that their precautionary incentives are reduced because they internalize that any losses they su¤er will lead to a decline in aggregate bank capital and push up lending rates, which mitigates the losses. This increases risk-taking and bene…ts bankers at the expense of workers. Our …nding therefore highlights a new dimension of welfare losses from concentrated banking systems, leading to increased …nancial instability.
The redistributive e¤ects of deregulation are magni…ed when we allow for discretionary bailouts: Ex-post, workers …nd it collectively optimal to provide bailouts to bankers when aggregate bank capital is su¢ ciently scarce so as to ease the credit crunch and mitigate the decline in wages. This makes it di¢ cult to commit not to provide bailouts. Ex-ante, bailouts reduce the precautionary incentives of bankers and increase risk-taking even if they are provided in lump-sum fashion. If bailouts are contingent on the capital levels of individual …nancial institutions, the distortive e¤ects on risk-taking are reinforced, corresponding to the traditional moral hazard e¤ect.
We therefore identify a novel channel through which bailouts lead to redistributions between the …nancial sector and the real economy: they lead to greater risk-taking which boosts expected bank pro…ts but leads to a higher incidence of credit crunches and more severe externalities on workers in bad times. In expectation, the redistribution due to higher risk-taking is typically much larger than the outright transfers that …nancial institutions receive during bailouts, as we illustrate in an example. Financial deregulation exacerbates both of these e¤ects since it allows for higher risk and increases the probability and magnitude of bailouts.
Policy Implications Our paper highlights the distributive con ‡ict inherent in setting …nancial regulation. Given the two assumed …nancial market imperfections in our model, …nancial regulators have to trade o¤ greater e¢ ciency in the …nancial sector, which relies on risk-taking, versus greater e¢ ciency in the real economy, which requires a stable supply of credit.
If regulators care primarily about the real economy, for example, then their main concern is to ensure that bankers are well-capitalized so they can provide a stable supply of credit. Interpreting our results more broadly, this is aided by (i) separating risky activities, such proprietary trading, from traditional …nancial intermediation, (ii) imposing higher capital requirements on risky activities, in particular on those that do not directly contribute to lending to the real economy, (iii) limiting payouts if they endanger a su¢ cient level of capitalization in the …nancial sector, (iv) using structural policies that reduce incentives for risk-taking, e.g. by limiting market power, asymmetric managerial incentive contracts, …nancial innovations that increase risk-taking, and bailout expectations and (v) forcing recapitalizations when necessary, even if they impose private costs on bankers. Opposite conclusions apply if regulators place a larger welfare weight on bankers: they will roll back regulations on risk-taking, reduce capital requirements etc.
A Pareto-improvement could only be achieved if deregulation was coupled with measures that increase risk-sharing between bankers and the rest of the economy so that the upside of risk-taking is shared. Even if formal risk markets for this are absent, redistributive policies such as higher taxes on …nancial sector pro…ts that are used to strenghten the social safety net for the rest of the economy would constitute such a mechanism.
Literature This paper is related to a growing literature on the e¤ects of …nancial imperfections in macroeconomics (see e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010, for an overview). Most of this literature describes how binding …nancial constraints may amplify and propagate shocks (see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) and lead to signi…cant macroeconomic ‡uctuations that a¤ect output, employment and interest rates (see e.g. Gertler and Karadi, 2011) . However, little emphasis is placed on the redistributive e¤ects of such ‡uctuations between …nancial intermediaries and the rest of the economy. The main contribution of our paper is to …ll this gap and show that binding …nancial constraints lead to signi…cant negative externalities so that risk-taking bene…ts the …nancial sector at the expense of the real economy when risk markets are incomplete. Our paper is also related to a long and growing literature on …nancial regulation (see e.g. Freixas and Rochet, 2008 , for a comprehensive review), but puts the distributive implications of such …nancial policies center stage. One recent strand of this literature argues that …nancial regulation should be designed to internalize pecuniary externalities in the presence of incomplete markets. See e.g. Lorenzoni (2008) , Korinek (2010ab, 2012) , Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) , Korinek (2011) and Gersbach and Rochet (2012) for papers on …nancial regulation motivated from asset price externalities, or Caballero and Lorenzoni (2010) for a paper on currency intervention based on wage externalities in an emerging economy. Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) study pecuniary externalities on the interest rate that arise in the transition from an equilibrium with low household debt to an equilibrium with high household debt. They show that deregulation that relaxes collateral constraints on borrowers may reduce borrower welfare by increasing the interest rate. Our paper is based on pecuniary externalities from bank capital to wage earners and studies the redistributive implications of …nancial deregulation and bailouts.
A second strand of the literature on …nancial regulation argues that an important objective of regulation is to limit the risk-shifting of …nancial institutions that are subject to government guarantees (see e.g. Hall, 2010, and Martinez-Miera and Suarez, 2012) . Our contribution to this literature is twofold: …rst, we provide an endogenous rationale for why it is in the interest of workers to provide bailouts once a crisis has occurred. In our model, such transfers lead to a Pareto improvement because they substitute for missing markets. In existing macroeconomic models (see e.g. Bianchi, 2012; Sandri and Valencia, 2013) , the desirability of bailouts has only been shown in models in which the transfer is made by a representative agent who also owns the recipient banks so that redistributive e¤ects are by de…nition avoided. Secondly, we put the redistributive e¤ects of bailout policies center stage. Our …ndings are also related to an emerging literature that shows that expansive monetary policy during crises works in part by redistributing wealth (see e.g. Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2012) .
In the discussion of optimal capital standards for …nancial institutions, Admati et al. (2010) and Miles et al. (2012) have argued that society at large would bene…t from imposing higher capital standards. They focus on the direct social costs of risk-shifting by banks on governments. We focus instead on the indirect social costs caused by credit crunches. Estimates suggest that in most countries, including in the US, the social cost of credit crunches far outweighed the direct monetary costs of bailouts related to the …nancial crisis of 2008/09 (see e.g. Haldane, 2010) .
Our paper is also related to a growing literature that focuses on the role of the growth of the …nancial sector in increasing societal inequality over the past decades (see e.g. Kaplan and Rauh, 2010; Philippon and Reshef, 2012) as well as the implications for …nancial instability and crises (see e.g. Kumhof and Ranciere, 2012) . We provide a uni…ed explanation for the increase in inequality and instability based on the notion that the centrality of the …nancial sector in a modern market economy may allow the sector to extract large rents by increasing its risk-taking.
At a technical level, the exclusive role of bankers in intermediating capital is related to a literature on "bottlenecks," which describes how the supplier of an essential productive input can earn rents from restricting supply to her customers (see e.g. Rey and Tirole, 2007 , for an overview). In our framework, bankers earn similar rents when risk-taking creates an aggregate scarcity of bank capital.
There is also a growing empirical literature that documents the importance of …nancial sector capital for the broader economy and that underpins our modeling assumptions. Adrian et al. (2010) provide evidence that the capital position of …nancial intermediaries has strong e¤ects on the real economy. Haldane (2010) estimates that the Great Financial Crisis of 2008/09 imposed social costs on the world economy in the order of magnitude of several trillion dollars. Furceri et al. (2013) provide cross-country evidence on the deleterious e¤ects of capital account liberalization on inequality.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: The ensuing section develops an analytical model in which bankers intermediate capital to the real economy. Section 3 analyzes the determination of equilibrium and how changes in bank capital di¤erentially a¤ect the two sectors. Section 4 describes the redistributive con ‡ict over risk-taking between bankers and the real economy. In section 5, we analyze the impact of factors such as …nancial innovation, agency problems, market power and discretionary bailouts on this con ‡ict.
2 Bank Capital and Workers
Model Setup
We assume an economy with three time periods, t = 0; 1; 2, and a unit mass each of two types of agents: bankers and workers. Furthermore, there is a single good that serves both as consumption good and capital.
Bankers In period 0, bankers are born with one unit of the consumption good. They invest a fraction x 2 [0; 1] of it in a project that delivers a risky payo¤Ã in period 1 with a continuously di¤erentiable distribution function G(Ã) over the domain [0; 1), a density function g(Ã) and an expected value E[Ã] > 1. They hold the remainder (1 x) in a storage technology with gross return 1.
After the realization of the risky payo¤Ã in period 1, the resulting equity level of bankers is e = xÃ + (1 x)
Consistent with the literature on banking regulation, we will frequently use the term "bank capital" to refer to bank equity e in the following. In period 1, bankers raise d deposits at a gross deposit rate of r and lend k d + e to the productive sector of the economy at a gross interest rate R. In period 2, bankers are repaid and value total pro…ts in period 2 according to a linear utility function = Rk rd
Workers Workers are born in period 1 with a large endowment m of consumption goods. They lend an amount d of deposits to bankers at a deposit rate of r and hold the remainder in a storage technology with gross return 1.
No arbitrage implies that the deposit rate satis…es r = 1.
In period 2, workers inelastically supply one unit of labor`= 1 at the prevailing market wage w. (The main insights of our framework are unchanged if labor supply is elastic.) Worker utility depends only on their total consumption. For notational simplicity we normalize the expression for worker utility by subtracting the constant m so that u = wR emark: In the described framework, risk markets between bankers and workers are incomplete since workers are born in period 1 after the technology shockÃ is realized and cannot enter into risk-sharing contracts with bankers in period 0. All the risk xÃ from investing in the risky technology therefore needs to be borne by bankers. An alternative microfoundation for this market incompleteness would be that obtaining the distribution function G(Ã) requires that bankers exert an unobservable private e¤ort, and insuring against ‡uctuations inÃ would destroy their incentives to exert this e¤ort. In practice, bank capital is subject to signi…cant ‡uctuations, as illustrated in Figure 1 , and a large fraction of this risk is not shared with the rest of society. 3 We will investigate the implications of reducing this market incompleteness below in Section 4.1.
Firms Workers collectively own …rms, which are neoclassical and competitive and produce in period 2. Firms rent capital k from bankers at interest rate R at the end of period 1, and hire labor`from workers at wage w in period 2. They seek to maximize pro…ts F (k;`) w` Rk, where F (k;`) = Ak `1 with 2 (0; 1). For simplicity, we assume that there is no uncertainty in …rms' production. In equilibrium …rms earn zero pro…ts.
The …rst-order conditions of the …rm problem are
Remark 1: In the described setup, we have separated the risk-taking decision x of bankers from the …nancial intermediation function k by assuming they occur in separate time periods. This simpli…es our analysis, but implies that there is no direct contemporaneous bene…t to workers if bankers invest more in the risky payo¤ with higher expected return. We show in appendix A.2 that our results continue to hold if the risk-taking and …nancial intermediation functions of bankers are intertwined: we assume that the aggregate production function of the economy in both periods 1 and 2 is [Ã t x t + 1 x t ]F (k t ;`t) so that workers directly bene…t from risk-taking x t because they receive higher wages in period t. 4
Remark 2: Our model setup assumes for simplicity that the endowments of labor and savings as well as the …rms are owned by the same set of agents which we called workers. Our results would be unchanged if we assigned these ownership claims to separate types of agents since savers earn zero net returns and …rms earn zero pro…ts in equilibrium. For example, there could be an additional type of agent called capital owner who own all the savings and …rms of the economy.
3 For example, Wall Street banks routinely pay out up to half of their revenue as employee compensation in the form of largely performance-dependent bonuses, constituting an implicit equity stake by insiders in their …rms. A considerable fraction of remaining explicit bank equity is also held by insiders. Furthermore, only 17.9% of US households hold direct stock investments, and another 33.2% hold equity investments indirectly, e.g. via retirement funds or other mutual funds. And this equity ownership is heavily skewed towards the high end of the income distribution (see Table A2a in Kennickel, 2013) . 4 In a similar vein, it can be argued that risky borrowers (e.g. in the subprime segment) bene…tted from greater bank risk-taking because they obtained more and cheaper loans.
Period 0
Period 1 Period 2
• Banks enter with initial endowment 1
• Households enter and deposit d at rate r in banks
• Bankers supply capital k ≤ d + e to firms
• Households supply labor = 1
• Firms produce F (k, )
• Banks receive return Rk, households obtain w
• Banks pay households rd 
First-Best Allocation
A planner who implements the …rst-best maximizes aggregate surplus in the economy subject to the resource constraints of the economy,
In period 2, the optimal labor input is` = 1, and the optimal level of capital investment satis…es k = ( A) 1 1 , i.e. it equates the marginal return to investment to the return on the storage technology,
We call the resulting output level F (k ; 1) the …rst-best level of output, or potential output. As we discussed earlier, we assume that m is large so that the resource constraint k e + m is lax, i.e. there are always su¢ cient funds available in the economy to invest k in the absence of market frictions. The marginal product of labor at the …rst-best level of capital is w = F`(k ; 1).
In period 0, the …rst-best planner chooses the portfolio allocation that maximizes expected bank equity E [e]. Since E[Ã] > 1, she will pick the corner solution x = 1.
Since a fraction F (k ; 1) of production is spent on investment, the net social surplus generated in the …rst-best is
Financial Constraint
We assume that bankers are subject to a commitment problem to capture the notion that bank capital matters. Speci…cally, bankers have access to a technology that allows them to divert a fraction (1 ) of their gross revenue, where 2 [0; 1]. By implication depositors can receive repayments on their deposits that constitute at most a fraction of the gross revenue of bankers. Anticipating this commitment problem, depositors restrict their supply of deposits to satisfy the constraint rd Rk (1)
An alternative interpretation of this …nancial constraint follows the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998): Suppose that bankers in period 1 can shirk in their monitoring e¤ort, which yields a private bene…t of B per unit of period 2 revenue but creates the risk of a bank failure that may occur with probability and that results in a complete loss. Bankers will refrain from shirking as long as the bene…ts are less than the costs, or BRk [Rk rd]. If depositors impose the constraint above for = 1 B , they can ensure that bankers avoid shirking and the associated risk of bankruptcy. 5 Furthermore, our model assumes that all credit is used for production so that binding constraints directly reduce supply in the economy. An alternative and complementary assumption would be that credit is required to …nance (durable) consumption so that binding constraints reduce demand. In both setups, binding …nancial constrainst hurt the real economy, with similar redistributive implications. 6 wages are ‡exible. The …nancial constraint is loose if bank equity is su¢ ciently high so that bankers can intermediate the …rst-best amount of capital, e e = (1 )k . In this case, the deposit and lending rates satisfy r = R = 1 and bankers earn zero returns on their lending activity. The wage level is w = (1 ) F (k ; 1). We interpret this situation as "normal times." If bank equity is below the threshold e < e then the …nancial constraint binds and the …nancial sector cannot intermediate the …rst-best level of capital. We interpret this situation as a "credit crunch" or "…nancial crisis" since the binding …nancial constraints reduce output below its …rst-best level. Workers provide deposits up to the constraint d = Rk=r, the deposit rate is r = 1, and the lending rate is R = F k (k; 1). Equilibrium capital investment in the constrained region, denoted byk (e), is implicitly de…ned by the equation
which has a unique positive solution for any e 0. Overall, capital investment is given by the expression
Equilibrium k(e) is strictly positive, strictly increasing in e over the domain e 2 [0; e ) and constant at k for e e . The equilibrium lending rate and the wage level satisfy, respectively,
Let us distinguish aggregate bank equity e, and the equity e i of an individual banker indexed by i. Then we can describe the level of capital intermediated by banker i and the resulting pro…ts by 7 k e i ; e = min k ; e i 1 R (e) e i ; e = e i + [R(e) 1] k e i ; e
In equilibrium, e i = e will hold, and we denote the equilibrium pro…ts of the banking sector as a whole as well as the utility of workers by of the …rst best level. In this region, the welfare of workers and of bankers are strictly increasing concave functions of bank equity. Once bank capital reaches the threshold e , the economy achieves the …rst-best level of investment. Any bank capital beyond this point just reduces the amount of deposits that bankers need to raise, which increases their …nal payo¤ in period 2 but does not bene…t workers. Beyond the threshold e , worker utility therefore remains constant and bank pro…ts increase linearly in e. This generates a non-convexity in the function (e) at the threshold e . Our analytical …ndings on the value of bank capital are consistent with the empirical regularities of …nancial crises that we depicted in Figure 1 on page 2.
Marginal Value of Bank Capital
How do changes in bank capital a¤ect output and the distribution of surplus in the economy? If bankers are …nancially constrained in aggregate, i.e. if e < e , then a marginal increase in bank capital e allows bankers to raise more deposits and leads to a greater than one-for-one increase in capital investment k. Applying the implicit function theorem to (2) in the constrained region we …nd
for e e If bankers are unconstrained, e e , then additional bank equity e leaves capital investment una¤ected at the …rst-best level k ; therefore k 0 (e) = 0.
The marginal e¤ect of additional bank capital on total surplus is s 0 (e) = 1+(F k 1) k 0 (e). The …rst term captures the consumption value of an additional unit of wealth for bankers. The second term captures that bank capital e raises investment in real capital by k 0 (e) which earns a marginal return (F k 1).
Looking at the distribution of this additional surplus between bankers and workers we …nd
The e¤ects of changes in bank equity for the two sectors di¤ers dramatically depending on whether the …nancial constraint is loose or binding. In the unconstrained region e e , the consumption value for bankers is the only bene…t of bank capital since k 0 (e) = 0 and so w 0 (e) = 0 and 0 (e) = 1. Bank capital is irrelevant for workers and the bene…ts of additional bank capital accrue entirely to bankers.
By contrast, in the constrained region e < e , additional equity increases capital intermediation k and output F (k; 1). A fraction (1 ) of the additional output F k accrues to workers via increased wages, and a fraction of the output net of the additional capital input accrues to bankers. These e¤ects are illustrated in Panel 2 of Figure 3 .
Technically, the e¤ects of bank capital on wages w (e) and the return on capital R (e) in the constrained region constitute pecuniary externalities. When atomistic bankers choose their optimal equity allocations, they take all prices as given and do not internalize that their collective actions will have general equilibrium e¤ects that move wages and the lending rate. In particular, they do not internalize that equity shortages will hurt workers by pushing down wages and pushing up lending rates.
The decline in wages when e < e occurs because labor is a production factor that is complementary to capital in the economy's production technology. The increase in lending rates when e < e occurs because the …nancial constraint drives the return to capital investment up to R (e) = F k (k (e) ; 1) > 1 since not all productive investments can obtain loans. The di¤erence between the lending rate and the deposit rate r = 1 allows bankers to earn a spread R (e) 1 when the constraint is binding. Observe that this spread plays a useful social role in allocating risk because it signals to bankers that there are extra returns available for carrying capital into states of nature when it is scarce. However, it redistributes from workers to bankers by enabling them to earn a scarcity rent on their capital.
Equity Shortages and Redistribution
It is instructive to observe that small shortages of …nancial sector capital have …rst order redistributive e¤ects but only second order e¢ ciency e¤ects. In particular, consider an economy in which bank capital is e so that the unconstrained equilibrium can just be implemented. Assume that we engage in a wealth-neutral reallocation of the wealth of bankers across periods 1 and 2: we take away an in…nitesimal amount " of bank capital from bankers in period 1 so as to tighten their …nancial constraint and return it to them in period 2. The resulting payo¤s for bankers and workers are (e ") + " and w (e ").
Lemma 1 (Redistributive E¤ects of Equity Shortages) A marginal tightening of the …nancial constraint around the threshold e has …rst-order redistributive e¤ ects but only second-order e¢ ciency costs.
Proof. We take the left-sided limit of the derivative of the payo¤ functions of bankers and workers to …nd lim "!0
The e¤ect on total surplus consists of the sum of the two s 0 = 0 + w 0 and is zero at a …rst-order approximation.
Interestingly, a marginal tightening of the constraint imposes losses on workers from lower wages that precisely equal the gains to bankers from higher lending spreads, i.e. the redistribution between workers and bankers occurs at a rate of one-to-one. Conceptually, this is because pecuniary externalities are by their very nature redistributions driven by changes in prices. In our model, when …nancial constraints reduce the amount of capital intermediated and push down wages, the losses of workers equal the gains to …rms. Similarly, when the lending rate rises, the losses to …rms equal the gains to bankers. Since …rms make zero pro…ts, we can conclude that the losses to workers have to equal the gains to bankers. Intuitively, since bankers are the bottleneck in the economy when the …nancial constraint binds, they extract surplus from workers in the form of scarcity rents.
Determination of Period 0 Risk Allocation
An individual banker i takes the lending rate R as given and perceives the constraint on deposits d Rk as a simple leverage limit. When a banker is constrained, she perceives the e¤ect of a marginal increase in bank capital e i as increasing her intermediation activity by k 1 e i ; e = 1 1 R , which implies an increase in bank pro…ts by
In period 0, bankers decide what fraction x of their endowment to allocate to the risky project. In the laissez-faire equilibrium, banker i takes the aggregate levels of x and e as given and chooses x i to maximize
At an interior optimum, the optimality condition of bankers is
i.e. the risk-adjusted return on the stochastic payo¤Ã equals the return of the safe storage technology. The stochastic discount factor 1 in this expression is given by equation (3) and is strictly declining in e as long as e < e and constant at 1 otherwise. Observe that each banker i perceives his stochastic discount factor as independent of his choices of e i and x i . However, in a symmetric equilibrium, e i = e as well as x i = x have to hold, and equilibrium is given by the level of x and the resulting realizations e =Ãx + (1 x) such that the optimality condition (5) is satis…ed. As long as E[Ã] > 1, the optimal allocation to the risky project satis…es x > 0. If the expected return is su¢ ciently high, equilibrium is given by the corner solution x = 1. Otherwise it is uniquely pinned down by the optimality condition (5).
Denote by x LF the fraction of their initial assets that bankers allocate to the risky project in the laissez faire equilibrium. The resulting levels of welfare for workers and entrepreneurs are
For a given risky portfolio allocation x, we de…ne by A (x) the threshold of A above which bank capital e is su¢ ciently high to support the …rst-best level of production. We can express this function as
Well-Capitalized Banking System If e 1, then the safe return is su¢cient to avoid the …nancial constraint and the …rst-best level of capital intermediation k would be reached for sure with a perfectly safe portfolio x = 0. We can interpret this case as an economy in which the …nancial sector is su¢ ciently capitalized to intermediate the …rst-best amount of capital without any extra risk-taking. In that case, we can interpret the risky projectÃ as a diversion from the main intermediation business of banks, e.g. a diversi…cation from retail banking into investment banking, or loans by US banks to Latin American governments that o¤er extra returns at extra risk.
For the case of e 1, bankers …nd it optimal to choose x LF > 1 e , i.e. they take on su¢ cient risk so that the …nancial constraint is binding at least for low realizations of the risky return so that A (x) > 0. This is because the expected return on the risky project dominates the safe return, and bankers perceive the cost of being marginally constrained as second-order. We also observe that for e < 1, the function A (x) is strictly increasing from A (1 e ) = 0 to A (1) = e , i.e. more risk-taking makes it more likely that the …nancial sector becomes constrained.
Under-Capitalized Banking System If e > 1, then the economy would be constrained if bankers invest all their endowment in the safe return. We can interpret this as an economy where banks are systematically undercapitalized and risk-taking helps them to mitigate these constraints. In that case, the function A (x) is strictly decreasing from lim x!0 A (x) = 1 to A (1) = e , i.e. more risk-taking makes it more likely that the …nancial sector becomes unconstrained.
Pareto Frontier
We describe the redistributive e¤ects of …nancial deregulation by characterizing the Pareto frontier of the economy, which maps di¤erent levels of …nancial risktaking into di¤erent levels of welfare for the …nancial sector and the real economy. Financial regulation/deregulation moves the economy along this Pareto frontier.
We denote the period 0 allocation to the risky project that is collectively preferred by bankers by
Similarly, we denote the choice of x collectively preferred by workers by
In a well-capitalized banking system, i.e. for e 1, workers prefer that risktaking in the …nancial sector is limited to the point where …nancial constraints will be loose in all states of nature so that the …rst-best level of capital investment k can be implemented. This is guaranteed for any x 2 [0; 1 e ]. Since workers are indi¤erent between all x within this interval but bankers bene…t from risk-taking, the only point from this interval that is on the Pareto-frontier is x W = 1 e . In an under-capitalized banking sytem, i.e. for e > 1, the optimal risk allocation for workers involves a positive level of risk-taking x W > 0 -workers bene…t from a little bit of risk because the safe return produces in-su¢ cient bank capital to intermediate the …rst-best amount of capital k , and risk-taking in period 0 increases the expected availability of …nance in period 1.
De…nition 2 (Pareto Frontier) The Pareto frontier of the economy consists of all pairs of bank pro…ts and worker wages ( (x) ; W (x)) for x 2 x W ; x B .
To ensure that the Pareto frontier is non-degenerate, we assume that the optimal levels of risk-taking for workers and in the decentralized equilibrium are interior and satisfy x W < 1 and x LF < 1. This is a weak assumption that holds whenever the risk-reward trade-o¤ associated withÃ is su¢ ciently steep.
Proposition 3 (Characterization of Pareto Frontier) (i) The risk allocations that are collectively preferred by workers and bankers, respectively, satisfy (iii) We …nd furthermore that
Proof. See appendix A.1. Figure 4 depicts the Pareto frontier for a typical portfolio allocation problem. The risk allocation that is optimal for workers x W is at the bottom right of the …gure, and the allocation preferred by bankers is at the top left. The laissez faire equilibrium is indicated by the marker x LF . As risk-taking x increases, we move upwards and left along the Pareto frontier. Along the way, expected bank pro…ts rise for two reasons: …rst, because the risky technology o¤ers higher returns; secondly because binding …nancial constraints redistribute from workers towards bankers, as we emphasized in lemma 1. The welfare of workers declines because they are more and more hurt by binding …nancial constraints.
Market Incompleteness and the Distributive Con ‡ict
To pinpoint why there is a distributive con ‡ict over the level of risk-taking, it is instructive to analyze the role of the two …nancial market imperfections in our results. First, assume that we remove the …nancial constraint on bankers in period 1. In that case, the pro…ts/losses of bankers do not a¤ect how much capital can be intermediated to the real economy and workers are indi¤erent about the level of risk-taking -bank capital does not generate any pecuniary externalities. In such an economy, …nancial risk-taking and …nancial intermediation are two orthogonal activities and we …nd that x W = x B = x F B = 1, i.e. the distributive con ‡ict disappears.
Secondly, assume that we introduce a complete insurance market in period 0 in which bankers and workers can share the risk associated with the technologỹ A, but we keep the …nancial constraint in period 1. In that case, workers will insure bankers against any capital shortfalls so that bankers can invest in the risky technology without imposing negative externalities on the real economy. By implication all agents are happy to invest the …rst-best amount x W = x B = x F B = 1 in the risky techology, and the distributive con ‡ict again disappears.
More generally, introducing a risk market in period 0 puts a formal price on risk-taking and, if both sets of agents can participate in this market, it implies that bankers and workers will agree on a common price of risk. Loosely speaking, this provides workers with a channel through which they can transmit their risk preferences to bankers.
An interesting special case in which …nancial markets in period 0 are e¤ectively complete is a 'Marxist'two sector framework in which bankers/capitalists own all the capital and households/workers own all the labor in the economy (i.e. there are no desposits d = 0 and no storage). By implication, bankers invest all their equity into real capital k = e. Given a Cobb-Douglas production technology, the two sectors earn constant fractions of aggregate output so that (e) = F (e; 1) and w (e) = (1 ) F (e; 1) for e =Ãx + (1 x). As long as the two sectors have preferences with identical relative risk aversion (in our benchmark model both have zero risk-aversion), the optimal level of risk-taking for capitalists simultaneously maximizes total surplus and worker welfare:
arg max Bank capital still imposes pecuniary externalities on wages in this 'Marxist' setting, but the pecuniary externalities under a Cobb-Douglas technology guarantee that both sets of agents obtain constant fractions of output, replicating the allocation under perfect risk-sharing. (Analytically, the constant capital and labor shares drop out of the optimization problem.) Again, there is no distributive con ‡ict.
By contrast, in our benchmark framework with the two market imperfections reintroduced, the negative pecuniary externalities only occur on the downside. Once bank capital exceeds the threshold where …nancial constraints are loose, it is irrelevant and has no further e¤ects on workers. The distributive con ‡ict is therefore generated by the combination of the occasionally binding …nancial constraints and the lack of risk-sharing between bankers and workers.
Financial Regulation
We interpret …nancial regulation in our framework as policy measures that a¤ect risk-taking x and therefore move the economy along the Pareto frontier. 9 The unregulated equilibrium -in the absence of any other market distortions -is represented by the laissez-faire equilibrium x LF on the frontier.
The two simplest forms of …nancial regulation of risk-taking are:
1. Regulators may impose a ceiling on the risk-taking of individual bankers such that x i x. Such a ceiling will be binding if x < x LF . This type of regulation closely corresponds to capital adequacy regulations as it limits the amount of risk-taking per dollar of bank equity.
2. Regulators may impose a tax x on risk-taking x i so as to modify the optimality condition for the risk-return tradeo¤ of bankers to E[ 1 (Ã x 1)] = 0. Such a tax can implement any level of risk-taking x 2 [0; 1]. For simplicity, we assume that the tax revenue is rebated to bankers in lump-sum fashion.
Financial regulators can implement any risk allocation x x LF by imposing x as a ceiling on risk-taking or by imposing an equivalent tax on risk-taking x 0. The distributive implications are straightforward:
Corollary 4 (Redistributive E¤ects of Financial Regulation) Tightening regulation by lowering x or raising x increases worker welfare and reduces banker welfare for any x 2 x W ; x LF .
Conversely, …nancial deregulation increases the ceiling x and redistributes from workers to bankers.
Scope for Pareto-Improving Deregulation An interesting question is whether there exists a mechanism for Pareto-improving deregulation if we add further instruments to the toolkit of policymakers in addition to the regulatory measures on x that we described in Corollary 4. Such a mechanism would need to use some of the gains from deregulation obtained by bankers to compensate workers for the losses they su¤er during credit crunches.
Consider …rst a planner who provides an uncontingent lump-sum transfer from bankers to compensate workers for the losses from deregulation. The marginal bene…t to workers is 1 E [w 0 (e)] if the transfer is given in period 1 or 1 E [w 0 (e)] if it is given in period 2, i.e. workers would obtain a direct marginal bene…t of 1 in all states of nature, but in constrained states they would be hurt by a tightening of the …nancial constraint which reduces their wages by w 0 (e) if given in period 1 or a fraction therefore if it is given in 9 Observe that a …nancial regulator would not …nd it optimal to change the leverage parameter in our setup. The parameter cannot be reduced because it stems from an underlying moral hazard problem and banks would default or deviate from their optimal behavior. Similarly, it is not optimal to increase because this would tighten the constraint on …nancial intermediation without any corresponding bene…t. period 2, since the transfer reduces the capital or the pledgeable income of bankers in period 2. Both types of uncontingent transfers entail e¢ ciency costs from tightening the constraints on bankers. Compensating workers with an uncontingent payment without imposing these e¢ ciency costs would require that the planner has superior enforcement capabilities to extract payments in excess of the …nancial constraint (1).
Alternatively, consider a planner who provides compensatory transfers to workers contingent on states of nature in which bankers are unconstrained, i.e. in states in which they make high pro…ts from the risky technologyÃ. This would not impose any e¢ ciency costs but would require that the planner can engage in state-contingent transactions that are not available via private markets in our model. (It can be argued that this type of transfer corresponds to proportional or progressive pro…t taxation.)
In short, the planner only has e¢ cient compensation mechanisms if she can get around at least one of the two …nancial market imperfections in our framework, i.e. if she can mitigate either the …nancial constraint (1) or the incompleteness of risk markets.
If the planner cannot improve on these market imperfections and/or if transfers require distortionary taxation, then the scope for Pareto-improving deregulation is more limited as the redistributive bene…t of any transfer has to be weighed against the cost of the distortion introduced. In general, this creates a constrained Pareto frontier along which the trade-o¤ between the welfare of the two agents is signi…cantly less favorable, i.e. a Pareto frontier that is enveloped by the frontier depicted in Figure 4 .
Risk-Taking and Redistribution
Factors that a¤ect risk-taking in the economy will also have …rst-order redistributive implications as they move the economy along its Pareto frontier. Many academics suggest that there are a number of other important imperfections that induce …nancial market participants to take on excessive risks (see e.g. Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Acharya et al., 2010) , for example market power, agency problems, and safety nets. Following our analysis, these distortions can be expected to redistribute welfare from workers to bankers by increasing the volatility of bank capital.
In the following, we illustrate this in more detail for the case of …nancial institutions with market power, managerial agency problems that lead to asymmetric payo¤s for managers, and …nancial innovation that creates new risk-taking opportunities. In the ensuing section we will examine how safety nets create additional redistributions by inducing bankers to take on more risk.
Financial Innovation
An important manifestation of …nancial innovation is to allow …nancial market players to access new investment opportunities, frequently projects that are characterized by both higher risk and higher expected returns. For example, …nancial innovation may enable bankers to invest in new activities, as made possible e.g. by the 1999 repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, or to lend in new areas, to new sectors or to new borrowers, as e.g. during the subprime boom of the 2000s.
Formally we capture this type of …nancial innovation by expanding the set of risky assets to which bankers have access in period 0. For a simple example, assume an economy in which bankers can only access the safe investment projects in period 0 before …nancial innovation takes place, and that …nancial innovation expands the set of investable projects to include the risky project with stochastic returnÃ. Furthermore, assume that e < 1, i.e. the safe return in period 0 generates su¢ cient period 1 equity for bankers to intermediate the …rst-best level of capital. The pre-innovation equilibrium corresponds to x = 0 in our benchmark setup and this maximizes worker welfare.
Example 1 (Distributive E¤ects of Financial Innovation) In the described economy, expanding the set of investment projects to includeÃ increases banker welfare but reduces worker welfare.
After …nancial innovation introduces the risky project, bankers allocate a strictly positive fraction of their endowment x LF > 1 e to the risky project and incur the risk of being …nancially constrained in low states of nature. This is their optimal choice because the expected return E[Ã] > 1 delivers a …rst-order bene…t over the safe return, but bankers perceive the cost of being marginally constrained as second-order since 1 e i ; e is continuous at e . Worker welfare, on the other hand, unambiguously declines as a result of the increased risktaking. Workers have nothing to gain from bank capital that exceeds e but they experience …rst-order losses if bank capital declines below e , constraining capital investment and reducing wages.
This illustrates that …nancial innovation that increases the set of investable projects so as to include more high-risk-high-return options may redistribute from workers to bankers, akin to …nancial deregulation, even though total surplus may be increased. The problem in the described economy is that workers would be happy for bankers to increase risk-taking if they could participate in both the upside and the downside via complete insurance markets.
Restrictions on the risk-taking activities of banks, e.g. via regulations such as the Volcker rule, may bene…t workers by acting as a second-best device to complete …nancial markets. In the example described above this would be the case.
Asymmetric Compensation Schemes
It is frequently argued that managers of …nancial institutions may have incentives to increase risk-taking because of asymmetric compensation schemes that reward them them for higher risk and that this may have played an important role in the build-up of risk before the …nancial crisis of 2008/09. We illustrate this mechanism using a stylized model of an incentive problem between bank owners and bank managers and analyze the distributive implications.
Let us extend our benchmark model by assuming that bank owners have to hire a new set of agents called bank managers to conduct their business. Bank managers choose an unobservable level of risk-taking x in period 0. Bank owners are able to observe the realization of bank capital e in period 1 and to instruct managers to allocate any bank capital up to e in …nancial intermediation, and managers carry any excess max f0; e e g in a storage technology. We can view …nancial intermediation versus storage as representative of lending to real projects versus …nancial investments, or commercial banking versus investment banking.
Suppose that bank managers do not have the ability to commit to exert e¤ort in period 1 and can threaten to withdraw their monitoring e¤ort for both bank loans and storage in period 1. If they do not monitor, the returns on intermediation and storage (real projects and …nancial investments) are diminished by a fraction " and " respectively, where > 1. In other words, the returns to …nancial investments are more sensitive to managerial e¤ort than real investments. An alternative interpretation would be along the lines of Jensen (1986) that free cash provides managers with greater scope to abuse the resources under their control.
Assuming that managers have all the bargaining power and that we are in a symmetric equilibrium, the threat to withdraw their e¤ort allows them to negotiate an incentive payment from bank owners of p e i ; e = " min e i ; e ; (e ; e ) + " max 0; e i e
The marginal bene…t of bank equity for an individual manager is p 1 (e; e) = " 1 (e; e) for e < e and p 1 (e; e) = " 1 (e; e) = " for e e . Since …nancial investments require a greater incentive payment, the payo¤ of managers is relatively more convex than the payo¤ of banks (e; e) and managers bene…t disproportionately from high realizations of bank capital. Comparing this extension to our benchmark setup, we can view (x) as the joint surplus of bank owners and managers, and the two functions (x) and W (x) remain unchanged compared to our earlier framework -the only thing that changes is the level of x that will be chosen by bank managers.
Managers internalize the asymmetric payo¤ pro…le when they choose the level of risk-taking in period 0. They maximize E[p e i ; e ] where e i =Ãx i + 1 x i and their optimality condition is
It is then straightforward to obtain the following result:
Proposition 5 (Agency Problems and Risk-Taking) (i) The optimal choice of risk-taking of bank managers exceeds the optimal choice x LF in our benchmark model if the payo¤ function of managers is asymmetric > 1.
(ii) The expected welfare of workers is a declining function of .
Proof. For (i), observe that we can write p(e i ; e) = (e i ; e) + ( 1) e i e I e i e where I e i e is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 when e i e and 0 otherwise. The preferred choice of x by managers, call it x A , satis…es P 1 (x) = E h (Ã 1)p 1 (e i ; e) i 0. We can write this as
i is the owner's …rst-order condition. Now we argue that the second term is strictly positive. Note that we can write this term as
Since we have E[Ã 1] > 0 by assumption, and since (Ã 1) is an increasing function ofÃ, it follows that the integral over the upper half of the range must also be strictly positive. Therefore for all x, we have P 1 (x) > 1 (x), and in particular 1 (x LF > 0, and so x A > x LF . To prove (ii), we begin by showing that x A is strictly increasing in . Differentiating P 1 (x) with respect to yields E
, which is strictly positive. At the old preferred level of x, we now have P 1 (x) > 0, and so x A will increase. Now we observe that increasing x for x > x W will always make workers worse o¤. Given that x W < x LF < x A , this implies that increasing will make workers worse o¤.
Financial Institutions with Market Power
Assume that there is a …nite number n of identical bankers in the economy who each have mass 1 n . Banker i internalizes that his risk-taking decision x i in period 0 a¤ects aggregate bank capital e = 1 n e i + n 1 n e i , where e i captures the capital of the other bankers. For a given e, we assume that bankers charge the competitive market interest rate R (e) in period 1. 10 First consider the optimal level of capital supplied by bankers who partially internalize their e¤ect on interest rates and are not subject to a leverage constraint. Bankers solve
By contrast, if bankers interacted in Cournot-style competition in the period 1 market for loans, they would restrict the quantity of loans provided for a given amount of bank equity e i to min k e i ; k n where k n = k n (1 ) n whose solution is 1 n F kk k i + F k = 1. Assuming a symmetric solution, this will be satis…ed at k ;n = 1 1 n (1 ) 1 1 k which will be achieved at a level of equity e ;n = 1 1 1 n (1 ) k ;n . If e < e ;n , the deposit constraint binds and bankers receive the same pro…ts as before.
The marginal valuation of bank capital is now i;n 1 e i ; e i = 1 n 0 (e) + n 1 n i 1 e i ; e for e < e ;n 1
for e e ;n This falls in between the marginal value of bank capital for the sector as a whole and for a competitive banker, i.e. 0 < i;n 1 < i 1 . Since we have i;n 1 e i ; e = i 1 + 1 n 0 i 1 , we can write the optimality condition for one of n large …rms as
We immediately see that for n = 1, this reduces to 0 = 0, which has solution x B , and for n ! 1 this reduces to 1 = 0, which has solution x LF < x B . Now suppose that for a given n, we have x n 2 x LF ; x B . At x n , we di¤erentiate the optimality condition w.r.t. n and …nd d dn i;n 1 = 1 n 2 ( 0 1 )
Since 1 and 0 are both strictly decreasing in x, and since they are zero at x LF and x B > x LF respectively, in the interval (x LF ; x B ) we have 1 < 0 . Therefore for higher n we have d dn i;n 1 < 0, and so x n is decreasing in n. We summarize these results as follows:
Proposition 6 The optimal risk allocation x n of bankers is a declining function of the number n of banks in the market. In particular, we observe that x 1 = x B x 1 = x LF , with strict inequality unless they are corner solutions.
Intuitively, bankers with market power internalize that the bene…ts of additional equity when they are constrained accrue in part to the rest of the economy by relieving the credit crunch. This reduces their scarcity rents and therefore provides lower incentives for precautionary behavior. Our example illustrates that socially excessive risk-taking is an important dimension of non-competitive behavior by banks.
Bailouts
Bailouts have perhaps raised more redistributive concerns than any other form of public …nancial intervention, presumably because they involve redistributions in the form of explicit transfers that are much more transparent than other implicit forms of redistributions.
However, the redistributive e¤ects of bailouts are both more subtle and potentially more pernicious than this simple view suggests. Ex post, i.e. once bankers have su¤ered large losses and the economy experiences a credit crunch, bailouts may actually lead to a Pareto improvement and workers may be better o¤ by providing a transfer. However, ex-ante, bailout expectations increase risk-taking. This redistributes surplus from workers to the …nancial sector in a less explicit and therefore more subtle way, as we have emphasized throughout this paper.
Model of Endogenous Bailouts
Since bank capital is essential for the real economy, workers in our model …nd it optimal to coordinate to provide bailouts to bankers during episodes of severe capital shortages in order to mitigate the adverse e¤ects of credit crunches on the real economy. Such bailouts typically come in two broad categories, emergency lending, frequently at a subsidized interest rate, and equity injections, frequently at a subsidized (or even zero) price. We show in Appendix A.3 that no matter how exactly a bailout is provided, what matters in our model is the total amount of resources (subsidies) given to bankers to relax their binding …nancial constraints. For the remainder of this section, we focus for simplicity on bailouts in the form of direct transfers. The appendix generalizes our results.
Lemma 7 (Optimal Bailout Policy) If aggregate bank capital in period 1 is below a threshold 0 <ê < e , workers …nd it collectively optimal to provide lump-sum transfer t =ê e to bankers. The thresholdê is determined by the expression w 0 (ê) = 1 orê
Proof. The welfare of workers who collectively provide a transfer t 0 to bankers is given by w(e + t) t. An interior optimum satis…es w 0 (e + t) = 1. We de…ne the resulting equity level asê = e+t, which satis…es equation (6). Observe that w 0 (e) is strictly declining from w 0 (0) = 1= > 1 to w 0 (e ) = 1 1 < 1 over the interval [0; e ] so thatê is uniquely de…ned. If aggregate bank capital is below this threshold e <ê, bankers …nd it collectively optimal to transfer the shortfall. If e is above this threshold, it does not pay o¤ for workers to provide a transfer since w 0 < 1 and the optimal transfer is given by the minimum t = 0.
The intuition stems from the pecuniary externalities of bank capital on wages: increasing bank capital via lump-sum transfers relaxes the …nancial constraint of bankers and enables them to intermediate more capital, which in turn expands output and increases wages. As long as e <ê, the cost of a transfer on workers is less than the collective bene…t in the form of higher wages. If workers can coordinate, they will be collectively better o¤ by providing a transfer that lifts bank capital toê.
For the remainder of our analysis of bailouts, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 The parameters , and A are such thatê < 1.
This guarantees that the banking sector will not require a bailout if the period 0 endowment is invested in the safe project. It also implies that bailouts are not desirable in states of nature in which the risky project yields higher returns than the safe project. This is a mild assumption as we typically expect bailouts to occur in bad states of nature.
Period 1 Equilibrium We analyze the optimal bailout transfer policy of the worker sector in period 1 as a function of the aggregate bank capital position e. (We continue to assume that workers'period 1 wealth m is large so that it does not limit the size of the desired bailout.)
For e ê, the collective welfare of workers w (e) and bankers (e) are unchanged from the expressions in the benchmark model since no bailouts are given. For e <ê, the possibility of bailouts modi…es the expressions for welfare as follows:
w BL (e) = (1 ) F (e + t (e) ; 1) t (e) BL (e) = F (ê; 1)
We illustrate our …ndings in Figure 5 . The thresholdê below which bankers receive bailouts is indicated by the left dotted vertical line. Panel 1 shows bailouts t (e) and welfare of workers and bankers as a function of bank capital. Bailouts are positive but decrease to zero over the interval [0;ê]. Within this interval, they stabilize the pro…ts of bankers at the level (ê). The welfare of workers is increasing at slope 1 since each additional dollar of bank capital implies that the bailout is reduced by one dollar. Bailouts therefore make the payo¤ functions of all agents less concave and, in the case of bankers, locally convex.
Marginal Value of Bank Capital From the above expressions, we derive the marginal value of bank capital in the bailout region, i.e. for e <ê. We note that 1 + t 0 (e) = 0 in this region and …nd that the welfare e¤ects of a marginal increase in bank capital are
Panel 2 of Figure 5 depicts the marginal welfare e¤ects of bank equity under bailouts. The marginal bene…t for workers w BL0 (e) is 1 within the bailout region e <ê, since each additional dollar of bank equity reduces the size of the required bailout that they inject into bankers by a dollar. (In fact, we can determine the level ofê by equating the marginal bene…t of bank capital to workers in the absence of bailouts, corresponding to the downward-sloping dotted line w BL0 (e) = (1 ) F k in the …gure, to the marginal cost which is unity. This point is marked by a circle in the …gure.)
Bailouts constitute straight transfers from workers to bankers, but in our model, they nonetheless generate a Pareto improvement for a given e <ê in period 1 because they mitigate the market incompleteness that is created by the …nancial constraint (1) and that prevents bankers from raising deposit …nance and intermediating capital to the productive sector. At the margin, each additional unit of bailout generates a surplus F k (e; 1) 1, of which w 0 (e) 1 arises to workers and 0 (e) to bankers. For the last marginal unit of the bailout, the bene…t to workers is w 0 (ê) 1 = 0 -they are indi¤erent between providing the last unit or not. However, the marginal bene…t to bankers for the last unit is strictly positive 0 (ê) = 1 . One interpretation of this is that bankers are able to extract "bailout rents" from workers because of their bottleneck role in …nancial intermediation.
Period 0 Risk-Taking Optimal discretionary bailouts impose a ceiling on the market interest rate R BL (e) R (ê) = 1 1 since they ensure that aggregate capital investment is greater than the threshold k ê at all times. This mitigates the precautionary incentives of bankers and increases their optimal risk-taking, corresponding to a "wealth e¤ect" of bailouts. This e¤ect exists even if bailouts are conditional on aggregate bank capital e and are provided in the form of lump-sum transfers.
In addition, the adverse incentive e¤ects of bailouts are aggravated if they are conditional on individual bank capital e i , which provide bankers with incentives to increase risk-taking so as to increase the expected bailout rents received, corresponding to a "substitution e¤ect" of bailouts.
At a general level, we assume that the bailout received by an individual banker i for a given level of individual and aggregate bank equity (e i ; e) is allocated according to the function t e i ; e; = 0 if e ê e (1 ) e e i if e <ê where 2 [0; 1] captures the extent to which the bailout depends on individual bank equity. This speci…cation nests bailouts that are entirely conditional on aggregate bank capital (for = 0) as well as those conditional solely on individual bank capital (for = 1). Alternatively, if banks are non-atomistic and bailouts are conditional on aggregate bank capital e, we can interpret the parameter as the market share of individual banks, since each bank will internalize that its bank equity makes up a fraction of aggregate bank equity. We denote the amount of their endowment that bankers allocate to the risky project in period 0 by x BL ( ), and we …nd that bailouts have the following e¤ects:
Proposition 8 (Risk-Taking E¤ects of Bailouts) (i) Introducing bailout transfers increases period 0 risk-taking x BL ( ) > x LF for any = 0.
(ii) Risk-taking x BL ( ) is an increasing function of .
Proof. See appendix A.1.
Intuitively, point (i) re ‡ects that bailouts reduce the tightness of constraints and therefore the returns on capital 1 in low states of nature. This lowers the precautionary incentives of bankers and induces them to take on more risk, even if the bailouts are provided in a lump-sum fashion. Observe that this e¤ect is similar to the e¤ects of any countercyclical policy or any improvement in risksharing via markets. The e¤ect is also visible in Panel 1 of Figure 5 , in which the payo¤ function of bankers under bailouts is more convex than in the absence of bailouts, inducing them to increase their risk-taking.
For > 0, point (ii) captures that the risk-taking incentives of bankers rise further because they internalize that one more dollar in losses will increase their bailout by dollars. This captures the standard notion of moral hazard, i.e. that bailouts targeted at individual losses increase risk-taking.
Redistributive E¤ects
The welfare e¤ects of introducing bailouts on bankers and workers can be decomposed into two parts, the change in expected welfare from introducing bailouts for a given level of risk-taking x BL , corresponding to the market completion e¤ect of bailouts, and the change in the level of risktaking, corresponding to the incentive e¤ects of bailouts, : Figure 6 : Pareto frontier under bailouts Corollary 9 (Distributive E¤ects of Bailouts) (i) Bankers always bene…t from introducing bailouts and their expected pro…ts BL ( ) are an increasing function of .
(ii) Workers bene…t from the market completion e¤ ect of bailouts but are hurt by the incentive e¤ ects of bailouts if e < 1. The absolute magnitude of both e¤ ects is an increasing function of .
Proof. The …rst term is positive for both sets of agents because, for given x, bailouts generate a Pareto improvement. 11 The second term is always positive for bankers because 0 (x) > 0 and is always negative for workers for e < 1 because W 0 (x) < 0. Higher increases risk-taking and therefore leads to more bailouts, increasing the absolute magnitude of all four terms.
Although the market completion e¤ect is positive for both sets of agents, the increase in risk-taking bene…ts bankers at the expense of workers. Bailouts increase banker welfare both directly because of the transfers received from workers and indirectly as a result of the higher risk-taking.
We illustrate our …ndings in Figure 6 . The …gure shows how the Pareto frontier depicted in Figure 4 is a¤ected by the introduction of bailouts under the assumption that = 0, i.e. bailouts are distributed lump sum. The new Pareto frontier (solid line) is shifted out compared to the old frontier (dotted line) at its left end, i.e. BL (x) > (x) and W BL (x) > W (x) for all x > x W but is unchanged at x = x W as long as e < 1 (which holds in our parameterization). The shift in the frontier is thus biased towards bankers and the introduction of bailouts constitutes banker-biased technological change. In our …gure, risktaking increases signi…cantly even though = 0. Banker welfare rises by whereas worker welfare falls by W .
Conclusions
The central …nding of our paper is that …nancial regulation has important redistributive implications if the …nancial sector has an exclusive role in the process of credit intermediation and if …nancial markets are imperfect. The majority of the literature on …nancial regulation focuses on the e¢ ciency implications of …nancial regulation and disregards redistributive e¤ects. Welfare is typically determined by a planner who picks the most e¢ cient allocation under the assumption that the desired distribution of resources between di¤erent agents can be implemented independently.
However, if insurance markets are incomplete and if redistributions cannot be undone via lump-sum transfers -two conditions which seem highly relevant in the real world -maximizing aggregate output is an arbitrary concept. Weighting one dollar in the hands of workers and one dollar in the hands of bankers equally is just one arbitrary standard among many others. Depending on the welfare weights that a planner places on workers versus bankers, she may …nd it desirable to engage in more or less regulation of risk-taking in the …nancial sector.
We …nd that deregulation bene…ts the …nancial sector by allowing for greater risk-taking and higher expected pro…ts. However, the downside is that greater risk-taking leads to a greater incidence of losses that are su¢ ciently large to trigger a credit crunch. If the …nancial sector is constrained in its intermediation activity, the real economy obtains less credit and invests less, lowering output and the marginal product of labor, which imposes negative externalities on wage earners. The degree of …nancial regulation therefore has …rst-order redistributive implications.
More generally, we show that many other factors that increase risk-taking in the …nancial sector lead to a redistribution of expected welfare from workers to bankers. These factors include …nancial innovation that enhances risk-taking opportunities, agency problems, market power and bailouts.
There are a number of issues that we leave for future analysis: First, since risk-taking is pro…table, …nancial regulation generates large incentives for circumvention. If the regulatory framework of a country covers only one part of its …nancial system, the remaining parts will expand. In the US, for example, the shadow …nancial system grew to the point where it constituted a signi…cant part of the …nancial sector. This made the sector a bottleneck for credit intermediation and allowed it to extract signi…cant bailout rents in the aftermath of the 2008 …nancial crisis (see e.g. Korinek, 2013) .
Second, our paper rested on the assumption that a given set of agents, bankers, had the exclusive ability to intermediate capital to the rest of the economy. The rents of the …nancial sector could be reduced if alternative …nancial intermediaries can emerge and make up for the lost intermediation capacity of the …nancial sector when a crisis hits.
A Technical Appendix
A.1 Proofs Proof of Proposition 3. We …rst show that the marginal functions 0 (x), 1(x i ; x), and W 0 (x) are strictly decreasing in x by di¤erentiating each with respect to x,
Note that if it is indeed the case that x W < x B , then part (ii) of the proof follows immediately from this fact. Next we show that x LF < x B at an interior solution. At the point x LF we have 1 = 0. Then we …nd
Observe that the term
is strictly increasing in F k . Now we de…ne R as follows. If A 1, so that the term (Ã 1) < 0 over the entire interval, we let R be the value of F k whenÃ = A. If instead we have A > 1, then let R be the value of F k atÃ = 1. Then since F k is decreasing inÃ, we have
Recall that at x LF we have 1 = 0. We can write this as
Then since R 1 A (Ã 1)dG(Ã) > 0, we must have
Thus we have x LF < x B . If e 1 then x W = 1 e because workers prefer avoiding any constraints whereas x LF > 1 e because individual bankers would like to expose themselves to at least some constraints; therefore x W < x LF .
Finally, we show that x W < x B for interior solutions to prove (i). Observe that
Since at an interior solution we have W 0 (x W ) = 0, this implies 0 (x W ) > 0, and so 
The inequality holds because the second terms in the two expressions with integrals are identical and must be positive for 1 x LF ; x LF = 0 to hold. The …rst term in BL 1
x LF ; x LF ; is either positive or satis…es
(1 )
since (Ã 1) is strictly increasing and 1(e; e) is strictly decreasing over the interval [0;Â). Therefore individual bankers will choose to increase x BL > x LF if there is a positive probability of bailouts, con…rming point (i). For (ii), consider the e¤ect of an increase in . Di¤erentiating the optimality condition at x BL for a given yields
where the inequality holds sinceÂ < 1.
A.2 Period 0 Production Function
This appendix generalizes our setup to a symmetric Cobb-Douglas production function across periods t = 1 and 2 of the form hÃ
This allows us to account for the notion that the higher returns from risk-taking in the initial period are shared between workers and bankers. We continue to assume that bankers choose the fraction xt allocated to risky projects and …rms choose the amount of capital invested kt before the productivity shockÃt is realized, i.e. in period t 1.
In period 0, bankers supply their initial equity e0 to …rms for capital investment so that k0 = e0. In period 1, the productivity shockÃ1 is realized and …rms hire `= 1 units of labor to produce outputÃ1F (e0; 1). Bankers and workers share the productive output according to their factor shares,
where equation (7) represents the law-of-motion of bank equity from period 0 to period 1. Given the period 1 equity level e1, the economy behaves as we have analyzed in Section 3.1 in the main body of the paper, i.e. bankers and workers obtain pro…ts and wages of (e1) and w(e1). Observe that all agents are risk-averse with respect to period 2 consumption; therefore the optimal x2 1 and we can solve for all allocations as if the productivity parameter in period 2 was the constant A = E[Ã2], as in our earlier analysis. We express aggregate welfare of bankers and workers as a function of period 0 risk-taking x1 as
where e1 and w1 are determined by risk-taking and the output shock, as given by equation (7).
Observe that in addition to the e¤ects of risk-taking on period 2 wages w(e1) that we investigated earlier, period 1 wages now depend positively on risk-taking x1 because wages are a constant fraction (1 ) of output and greater risk leads to higher period 1 output since E[Ã1] > 1. Bankers do not internalize either of the two externalities on period 1 and period 2 wages.
Assuming an interior solution for x1 and noting that 0 (e1) 1 = ( F k 1)k 0 (e1), the optimal level of risk-taking for the banking sector x B 1 satis…es
The banking sector prefers more risk than workers if W 0 (x B 1 ) < 0:
where we subtracted the expression (1 )F (e0; 1) 0 (x B 1 ) = 0 in the second line, which is zero by the optimality condition of bankers.
Let us impose two weak assumptions that allow us to sign this expression. First, assume > , i.e. leverage is above a minimum level that is typically satis…ed in all modern …nancial systems (1.5 for the standard value of = 1=3), and secondly, that A < 1, i.e. only low realizations of the productivity shock lead to credit crunches. Note that these two assumptions are su¢ cient but not necessary conditions. Now observe that the …rst term under the integral, w 0 (e), is always positive. To sign the second term, notice that F k (k; 1) F k (k(0); 1) = 1= 8 e 0 and so the assumption > implies that ( F k 1) < 0. Furthermore, by the second assumption, the term (Ã 1) is negative since the integral is over the interval [0;Â]. As a result, the two conditions are su¢ cient to ensure that the expression is always negative and that workers continue to prefer less risk-taking than the banking sector.
Intuitively, our distributive results continue to hold when we account for production and wage earnings in both time periods because the distributive con ‡ict stems from the asymmetric e¤ects of binding …nancial constraints on bankers and workers, which are still present: workers are hurt from binding constraints but do not bene…t from overabundant bank capital; by contrast bankers bene…t from extra capital via increased dividend payments. Therefore workers prefer less risk-taking than bankers.
A.3 Variants of Bailouts
This appendix considers bailouts that come in the form of emergency lending and equity injections and shows that both matter only to the extent that they provide a subsidy (outright transfer in expected value) to constrained bankers that relaxes their …nancial constraint.
Emergency Lending A loan d BL that a policymaker provides to constrained bankers on behalf of workers at an interest rate r BL that is frequently subsidized, i.e. below the market interest rate r BL 1. Such lending constitutes a transfer of r BL 1 d BL in net present value terms. 1 2 Assuming that such interventions cannot relax the commitment problem of bankers that we described in section 2.3, they are subject to the constraint rd + r BL d BL Rk (1') Equity Injections provide constrained bankers with additional bank equity q in exchange for a dividend distribution D, which is frequently expressed as a fraction of bank earnings. The equity injection constitutes a transfer of q D from workers to bankers in net present value terms. Assuming that the dividend payment is subject to the commitment problem of bankers that we assumed earlier, it has to obey the constraint rd + D Rk (1") Given our assumptions, both types of bailouts are isomorphic to a lump-sum transfer t from workers to bankers. 1 3 In the following lemma, we will …rst focus on an optimal lump-sum transfer and then show that the resulting allocations can be implemented either directly or via an optimal package of emergency lending or equity injection.
Lemma 10 (Variants of Bailouts) Both workers and bankers are indi¤ erent between providing the bailout via subsidized emergency loans such that 1 r BL d BL = t or via subsidized equity injections such that q D = t. Conversely, emergency lending and/or equity injections that do not represent a transfer in net present value terms are ine¤ ective in our model.
Proof. Let us …rst focus on an emergency loan package described by a pair (r BL ; d BL ) that is provided to bankers by a policymaker on behalf of workers. Since the opportunity cost of lending is the storage technology, the direct cost of such a loan to workers is (1 r BL )d BL . Bankers intermediate k = e + d + d BL where we substitute d from constraint (1') to obtain k = e + 1 r BL d BL 1 R (k) = k e + 1 r BL d BL Therefore the emergency loan is isomorphic to a lump sum transfer t = 1 r BL d BL for bankers, workers and …rms. For an equity injection that is described by a pair (q; D), an identical argument can be applied. These observations directly imply the second part of the lemma. More speci…cally, constraint (1') implies that an emergency loan of d BL at an unsubsidized interest rate r BL = 1 reduces private deposits by an identical amount d = d BL and therefore does not a¤ect real capital investment k. Similarly, constraint (1") implies that an equity injection which satis…es q = D reduces private deposits by d = D and crowds out an identical amount of private deposits.
This captures an equivalence result between the two categories of bailouts -what matters for constrained bankers is that they obtain a transfer in net present value terms, but it is irrelevant how this transfer is provided. From the perspective of bankers who are subject to constraint (1), a one dollar repayment on emergency loans or dividends is no di¤erent from a one dollar repayment to depositors, and all three forms of repayment tighten the …nancial constraint of bankers in the same manner. An emergency loan or an equity injection at preferential rates that amounts to a one dollar transfer allows bankers to raise an additional R 1 R dollars of deposits and expand intermediation by 1 1 R dollars in total. Emergency loans or equity injections that are provided at 'fair'market rates, i.e. that do not constitute a transfer in net present value terms, will therefore not increase …nancial intermediation. We assumed that the commitment problem of bankers requires that they obtain at least a fraction (1 ) of their gross revenue. If government does not have a superior enforcement technology to relax this constraint, any repayments on emergency lending or dividend payments on public equity injections reduce the share obtained by bankers in precisely the same fashion as repaying bank depositors. Such repayment obligations therefore decrease the amount of deposits that bankers can obtain by an equal amount and do not expand capital intermediation.
Conversely, if government had superior enforcement capabilities to extract repayments or dividends, then those special capabilities would represent an additional reason for government intervention in the instrument(s) that relax the constraint most. For illustrative purposes, we decreased and chose A so as to leave e unchanged compared to the previous set of …gures. The decrease in raises the bailout threshold e so that the e¤ect of bailouts on period 0 risk-taking decisions is more pronounced and better visible.
B Model Parameterization

C Data Sources
Data for Figure 1 Unless otherwise noted, data is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database (Federal Reserve Economic Data).
Panel 1: Bank equity is calculated as the di¤erence between the series "Total Liabilities and Equity" and "Total Liabilities" in the "Financial Business" category, from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data (series FL -79 -41900 and 41940). The market value of equity is used since book values do not re ‡ect the losses incurred during the …nancial crisis in real time. The resulting series is de ‡ated by "Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price De ‡ator" (FRED series GDPDEF).
Panel 2: The spread on risky borrowing in Panel 4 is the di¤erence between "Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield" (FRED series BAA) and "10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate" (FRED series DGS10).
Panel 3: The real wage bill is "Compensation of employees, received" (FRED series W209RC1) de ‡ated by "Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price De ‡ator" (FRED series GDPDEF).
